Part 4 of a series

GENERAL SANTOS CITY (MindaNews/8 Nov) — Could the Court reconsider its thinking and decision? 

IV. Inconsistencies

The Court struck down the MOA-AD not only for being unconstitutional but also for being inconsistent with or contrary to R.A. No. 9054, the Organic Act of the ARMM, and R.A. 8371, the IPRA or Indigenous People’s Rights Act as well as the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The facts supporting this decision may not be disputed but some flaws and inconsistencies invite perusal.

The MILF is dissatisfied with R. A. 9054 and the ARMM so that in the MOA-AD it is proposing a new autonomous region, the BJE. Why should the MOA-AD be struck down partly for being inconsistent with the ARMM and its organic law? Necessarily, they have to be different since the BJE is being proposed as an improvement of or an alternative to the ARMM.

The ancestral domain in the MOA-AD is the territory of the BJE, the extent of its political jurisdiction and the source of its economic existence. Why should it be restricted to the IPRA when its purpose and the concept of ancestral domain are different?

Curiously, though, it may be asked: How critical are the inconsistencies discussed by the Court pertaining to R.A. 9054, R.A. 8371 and UN DRIP?

“Bangsamoro People”

The Court found the definition of “Bangsamoro people” in the MOA-AD inconsistent with that in R.A. 9054. It ruled: “Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act of the ARMM is a bar to the adoption of the definition of “Bangsamoro people” as used in the MOA-AD.”

In Consensus (Paragraph) 1, Concepts and Principles of the MOA-AD, “Bangsamoro people” is extensively defined:

(a). Essentially: “It is the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as “Bangsamoro.”

(b). Historically: “The Bangsamoro people refers to those who are natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu Archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization of its descendants whether mixed or of full blood.”

(c). Inclusively: “Spouses and their descendants are classified as Bangsamoro.”

(d). Optionally: “The freedom of choice of the Indigenous people shall be respected.”

In Article X, Section 3 of R.A. 9054, the “Bangsamoro” is “Moro” or “Muslim”. It states:

As used in this Organic Act, the phrase “indigenous cultural community” refers to Filipino citizens residing in the autonomous region who are:

(a). Tribal peoples. These are citizens whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from other sectors of the national community; and

(b). Bangsa Moro people. These are citizens who are believers in Islam and who have retained some of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions.

The Court commented that “Bangsamoro” as used in the MOA-AD “sharply contrasts with that found in Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act, which, rather than lumping together the identities of the Bangsamoro and other indigenous peoples living in Mindanao, clearly distinguishes between Bangsamoro people and Tribal peoples”.

Is the Court correct?

Flawed

Definition is generic. It generally distinguishes a class or group (genus) and its members from other classes or groups and their members. The Court must be aware of this.

However, it obviously did not consider the flaws in the definitions in R.A. 9054. Look closely. “Tribal people” and its “member tribes”, as defined, are not distinguishable from “slum dwellers” and “poor rural communities”. “Bangsa Moro people”, principally “believers in Islam” (“Moro” or “Muslim”), has attributes not distinguishable from tribal people – who also “have retained some of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions”.

“Bangsamoro” was coined by the Moro rebel leaders in the late 1960s as their identity and that of the Moro people and others sympathetic to their cause. Some in the media used “Bangsa Moro” and until today the two could still be interchanged. Congress used the second form. By its nuances known to the Moro Front leaders, “Bangsamoro” must be distinct from “Bangsa Moro”.

The Court is wrong. There is no “lumping together” of identities in the MOA-AD. On the other hand, the Court has confused “Bangsa Moro” with “Bangsamoro”, presuming they are the same. While the Court is confused, in either the MOA-AD or R.A. 9054, the distinction is clear.

In the MOA-AD, “Bangsamoro people” consists of “all Moros and all indigenous peoples of Mindanao. “Bangsa Moro” in R.A. 9054 is “Moro” in MOA-AD. “Tribal peoples” in R.A. 9054 is “indigenous peoples” in MOA-AD. Generically, “Indigenous cultural community” in R.A. 9054 is “Bangsamoro” in MOA-AD.

Viewing it from another angle may help the Court clear its confusion.

MOA-AD viewpoint: The Bangsamoro people consists of the Maranaos, Maguindanaos, Tausugs, etc. (Moros) and the Manobos, Blaans, Tedurays, etc. (indigenous peoples).

R.A. 9054 viewpoint: The indigenous cultural community consists of the Maranaos, Maguindanaos, Tausugs, etc. (Bangsa Moro) and the Manobos, Blaans, Tedurays, etc. (Tribal peoples).

Indigenous

Another question may arise: In the MOA-AD, the Moro is distinct from the indigenous peoples. Is the Moro indigenous? Certainly! As class names, the Bangsamoro and indigenous cultural communities are the same.

The Court’s concept of “indigenous peoples” essentially applies to the Moro tribes and the indigenous or tribal peoples. It states:

“Turning now to the more specific category of indigenous peoples, this term has been used, in scholarship as well as international, regional, and state practices, to refer to groups with distinct cultures, histories, and connections to land (spiritual and otherwise) that have been forcibly incorporated into a larger governing society. These groups are regarded as “indigenous” since they are the living descendants of pre-invasion inhabitants of lands now dominated by others.”

It continues: “Otherwise stated, indigenous peoples, nations, or communities are culturally distinctive groups that find themselves engulfed by settler societies born of the forces of empire and conquest. Examples of groups who have been regarded as indigenous peoples are the Maori of New Zealand and the aborigines of Canada.”

Consensus (Paragraph) 1, Concepts and Principles is consistent with this concept. However, as already pointed out, the definitions in Article X, Section 3 of R.A. 9054 do not distinguish the “Tribal peoples” and “Bangsa Moro” from slum dwellers and poor rural communities. Why strike down the MOA-AD because its correct definition of “Bangsamoro” is inconsistent or “sharply contrasts” with the flawed definitions in R.A. 9054?

UN DRIP

The Court has not pointed out any other inconsistency – or sharply contrasting provisions – of the MOA-AD and R.A. 9054. Surely there should be others. However, to show further that the MOA-AD, as presently worded, cannot be reconciled with laws, the Court lengthily referred to the UN DRIP (United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples).

Pursuant to Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution stating that the Philippines “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land”, the Court recognizes the UN DRIP adopted by the UN General Assembly on September 13, 2007 with the Philippines as among the 143 signatories. It applies to the Philippine indigenous peoples.

The Decision quoted Articles 3, 4 and 5 of UN DRIP recognizing “the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination, encompassing the right to autonomy or self-government”, noting that this only means right to “internal self-determination” – not “external self-determination” or secession. Comparing the three articles to the Concepts and Principles of the MOA-AD would is a revelation.

Article 3: Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right, they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. (Emphasis by the Court)

Article 4: Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous function. (Emphasis by the Court)

Article 5: Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions, while retaining their right to participate fully, if they so choose, in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the State.

The Court also quoted some of the UN DRIP articles (Articles 8, 21, 26, 30, 33, 37 and 38) that particularly define “the extent of self-determination”. They closely and positively compare with the MOA-AD.

The Court concluded:

“Assuming that the UN DRIP, like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, must now be regarded as embodying customary international law … the obligations enumerated therein do not strictly require the Republic to grant the Bangsamoro people, through the instrumentality of the BJE, the particular rights and powers provided for in the MOA-AD.” Of course! UN DRIP, like any other international laws are persuasive, not coercive.

Then, the Court qualified: “Even the more specific provisions of the UN DRIP are general in scope, allowing for flexibility in its application by the different States.” Alluding to the MOA-AD, it enumerated two instances:

The UN DRIP does not require that “States now guarantee indigenous peoples their own police and internal security force”.       

The UN DRIP does not acknowledge “the right of indigenous peoples to the aerial domain and atmospheric space”.

Why Not?

Most of the rights of the Bangsamoro people and the powers of the BJE provided in the MOA-AD are consistent with the UN DRIP. In the opinion of the Court, the Philippine State is not obliged to grant them. Is it because the MOA-AD will make the BJE more autonomous than the ARMM and allow the Bangsamoro people to enjoy more autonomy than they do now

In “1” above, the Court is saying that the BJE cannot have its own police and security force. But the Regional Police or Regional Security Force was provided in the 1996 FPA, Paragraphs 77 to 93 and in R.A. 9054, Article X. The MOA-AD includes “police and security force” – not military force – among the institutions of the BJE (Consensus 8, Governance). Why deny the BJE what has been allowed the ARMM?

The “2” above has no precedence. However, on the very slim chance that the Court would reconsider its Decision, should the negotiation resume on the unsigned MOA-AD, the lack of acknowledgment in the UN DRIP should not be the reason for the Philippine State not to grant it if the MILF can show convincingly its necessity.

Will the Court admit some inconsistencies in its Decision and reconsider?

(To Be Concluded)

(”Comment” is Mr. Patricio P. Diaz’ column for MindaViews, the opinion section of MindaNews. The Titus Brandsma Media Awards recently honored Mr. Diaz with a “Lifetime Achievement Award” for his “commitment to education and public information to Mindanawons as Journalist, Educator and Peace Advocate.” You can reach him at patpdiazgsc@yahoo.com.This e-mail address is being protected from spam bots, you need JavaScript enabled to view it )

“It has been days already like this, the baby would often stop breathing. But just when we think he is dead, he would come back to life,” says a woman in the adjoining makeshift shelter.

Meriam rouses herself from sleep, surprised to see a group of journalists crowding around their packed quarters inside a market stall here turned evacuation center in poblacion Munai.

Cradling him in her arms, she gently taps the baby’s cheeks several times to wake him up, as if checking whether there remains life within the little bundle. The baby remained motionless.

“The baby is dead,” someone frantically shouted. The crowd fell silent, waiting with bated breath, some with tears in their eyes. 

Baby Hamda is just 28 days old. Ever since the day he was born in early October inside the Munai evacuation camp, “nag-aagaw buhay siya lagi,” caught in a constant struggle between life and death, says the woman in the adjoining makeshift.

But just as all seemed without hope, the baby suddenly stirs back to life, breathing once again.

Everyone heaves a sigh of relief.  Journalists click on their cameras to capture what seemed to be a moment of light prevailing over death’s shadows.

Then, unexpectedly, the baby seems to go lifeless again. 

“We could not just watch and wait for him to die here,” an anxious voice exclaims.

It is the voice of Fr. Eduardo “Ponpon” Vasquez, head of I-watch, the video documentation arm of the Oblate Media and a GMA-7 stringer, who is then taking footage of the ongoing drama. 

Vasquez was with a team of journalists who was going around evacuation centers from North Cotabato to Maguindanao to Lanao del Sur and now, on their fourth day on the road and the last leg, here in Lanao del Norte. The media tour from October 27 to 31 was hosted by the Mindanao Peoples Caucus.

While it was always the stories of dying children that gripped them wherever they go, nothing is as compelling as the stark image of Baby Hamda withering gradually before their eyes. For the team that included veteran photojournalist Rene Lumawag who was the first to chance upon the baby, it is time to lay down their pens and cameras. 

“We’re bringing him to the hospital. Any moment now he will die,” said Vasquez who brought the mother and baby in his pick-up joining a four-vehicle convoy led by MindaNews.

The baby was first brought to a hospital in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte but had to be transferred to Iligan City for better facilities upon the advice of the attending doctor who suspected the baby to be suffering from severe pneumonia.

Baby Hamda at the Kauswagan District Hospital. MindaNews photo by Rene B. Lumawag

“He only has a 50-50 chance of survival,” said Dr. Arman Colao of the Kauswagan district hospital

Many not as fortunate

While a miracle may have saved Baby Hamda’s life that day, many other infants and children in about 150 evacuation centers scattered all over Central Mindanao were not as fortunate.

As the three-month-old military offensives against three out of 16 base commands of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) drag on,  the war is already exacting a heavy toll on civilians particularly children.  

Already, there are 56 internally displaced persons (IDPs) who have died in Maguindanao and Shariff Kabunsuan, 32 of whom due to illness and 18 from actual encounters, according to the Department of Health in the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (DOH-ARMM) in a November 4 report.

About 21 of the reported deaths caused by illness were ages five years old and below. Diarrhea is the number one leading cause of death among IDPs.

At the Munai evacuation center here alone, 11 evacuees have already died since August 18, seven of them children, mostly due to pneumonia and measles, according to Raissa Ariraya, a midwife at the Munai Municipal Health Center here.

Inside the health center here, among those confined were children evacuees Emran Balabagan, 7, from Sitio Dilabagen West, Barangay Bacolod and Suraini
Banglan, 1, from Barangay Ramayen, who were being treated for nausea, diarrhea and fever.

But seven imams (religious leaders) said that there were already 30 deaths since evacuations started on August 18. They also said that out of 26 barangays in Munai, 21 of them are now “ghost towns” due to military offensives in pursuit of MILF renegade commander Abdurahman Macapaar alias Kumander Bravo.

In Datu Piang and Mamasapano, Maguindanao, Mindanews earlier reported that at least 43 evacuees have already died, 23 of them children, citing records from the town hall and the rural health unit.

While at Datu Piang poblacion during the first leg of the media tour on October 27, Mindanews chanced upon 16-year-old Raiz Adteg who was carrying an umbrella over the body of his baby sister, one-year-old Anariza, who died that morning at the plaza turned evacuation center. 

Raiz was on his way to bury Anariza whose body was wrapped in a “malong” and a mat tied on two bamboo poles carried by his uncle and cousin. He said that they had no money to buy medicine that was why his baby sister died.

At a gazebo inside the Datu Piang town plaza, a father shared his story, on how he lost his only two children, Jamir, 3, and Jamiha, 1. Merin Hardeng from Barangay Irian, Datu Saudi Ampatuan recalled that the kids had been sick and had already been treated. But on the third day, Jamir died. On the following day, they also lost the baby girl, Jamiha, just when the family came home from burying Jamir.

Lawyer Zainudin Malang, director of the MoroLaw Center who joined the journalists in the five-day tour, called on international humanitarian organizations such as the International Committee on the Red Cross to “immediately attend to dying infants and children.”

Malang asserted that there should also be strict observance of the United Nation’s High Commission on Human Rights Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement where IDPs should be provided “safety, nutrition, health and hygiene and that members of the same family should not be separated.”

Worried about the looming humanitarian crisis, Malang bared plans among Moro CSOs to establish a refugee, human rights and media secretariate to monitor the worsening plight of IDPs and rising number of human rights violations.

The Amnesty International (AI) reported that there are already about 610,000 people displaced in the last two months of fighting in Mindanao. The report entitled “Shattered Peace in Mindanao: The Human Cost of Conflict in the Philippines” was released late October.

Mindanao-wide CSOs have also called on the United Nations to intervene and put the peace process between the Philippine government and MILF back on track to stop the war. 

The peace process collapsed when the  Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was supposed to have been formally signed on August 5 in Putrajaya, Malaysia. by the chairs of the government and the MILF peace panels. A temporary restraining order issued by the Supreme Court on August 4 however stopped the government peace panel chair and the Foreign Affairs secretary from signing. On October 14, the Supreme Court voted 8-7 declaring the MOA-AD unconstitutional.

Dwight Zabala, project consultant of the UNICEF’s Mindanao Desk based in Cotabato City, said that children IDPs should be accorded the rights to adequate food, health, play, leisure and other rights mandated under the UN Convention on the Rights of Children.

“They should also be protected from abuse, neglect and exploitation,” he added.

Zabala said that in response to the humanitarian crisis, they have set up a “child protection network” in Central Mindanao composed of 10 local and international non-government organizations. The network includes Mindanao Tulong Bakwet, Kadtuntaya Foundation Inc., Nonviolent Peaceforce, United Youth for Peace and Development (UNYPAD), United Youth of the Philippines (UNYPHIL)-Women, Oblates of Mary Immaculate-Integrated Rehabilitation Program (OMI-IRP), KAWAGIB Moro Human Rights Organization, Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA), and Community and Family Services International (CFSI).

The network is engaged in monitoring and documentation of grave child rights violations in situations of armed conflict including the killings of children. The monitoring system is in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1612 passed in 2005.

Among the killings that had been documented were the September 8 bombing in Datu Piang, Maguindanao that killed four children - Bailyn, 9; Zukarudin, 7; Adtayan, 5 and Faidza, 2 – of the Manuggal-Mandi family. A bomb dropped from a military  helicopter exploded near the boat they were riding in Barangay Butalo, Datu Piang, Maguindanao that also killed their father and 18-year-old pregnant sister, Aida.

The child protection network also set in place a system of identification and registration of separate and unaccompanied children caught in the conflict.

As for Baby Hamda, doctors have pronounced him out of danger and he is now back at the Munai evacuation center, a week after journalists intervened and brought him to the hospital on October 30.  

But once back inside evacuation centers, sick IDP children however recover slowly even after receiving treatment due to renewed exposure to health hazards, according to a DOH-ARMM report.     

Until perhaps Baby Hamda finally gets home, the struggle to survive

him and countless more other children evacuees, continues. (Charina Sanz/MindaNews)

2nd of a series

GENERAL SANTOS CITY  (MindaNews / October 31) – The MOA-AD has been declared “contrary to law and the Constitution”. Any hope for it – now dead – to animate the peace process is moot. But what chance could it have had the Court been a little liberal?
The Decision has the answers.

The President’s Powers

As the Court has acknowledged, despite that the “constitutional provisions on autonomy and the statutes enacted pursuant to them have … been partially successful” with the creation of the ARMM, “the Filipino people are still faced with the reality of an on-going conflict between the Government and the MILF”. The Court saw the problem the MOA-AD intended to address. What’s surprising, however, was that it skirted its prescribed solution.

The solution lies in the President. “Being uniquely vested with the power to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups, the President is in a singular position to know the precise nature of their grievances which, if resolved may bring an end to hostilities.”

However, the President needs some concessions: “If the President is to be expected to find means for bringing this conflict to an end and to achieve lasting peace in Mindanao, then she must be given the leeway to explore, in the course of peace negotiations, solutions that may require changes to the Constitution for their implementation.”

Its own prescription, notwithstanding, the Court deprived the President of “the leeway”. The MOA-AD was the product of three years and eight months of “exploration”.  Yet, the Court struck it down when local government executives of North Cotabato and the cities of  Zamboanga and Iligan complained of having not been consulted during the negotiation.

The unique power of the President to conduct peace negotiations must include the discretion when not to consult.  In the case of the MOA-AD, she knew – more than the complaining local government executives — the intricacies of the talks which can be messed up by third parties not privy to these intricacies by untimely intrusions.

Evidently, the Court did not consider this.

This does not mean that the right of the local government executives to be consulted has not been violated. But was that enough ground to scuttle the MOA-AD? Could consultations not have been made based on the agreement? It was not fully implementable in its initialed form. As the framework of the negotiation of the Comprehensive Compact, its flaws could have been effectively addressed in the CC – the Final Agreement.

As it appears in the Decision, the petitioners got all concessions and leeway while the President had none despite the Court’s prescription – give the President the necessary leeway to complement her unique power to conduct peace negotiations.

Limitation

By “leeway”, the Court in its Decision was explicitly referring to possible considerations for solutions including those that call for the amendment of the Constitution before they can be implemented. Such is the MOA-AD. And the leeway was expected from the Court, since it had accepted the MOA-AD for judicial review.  It instead blocked the leeway with limitation.

Of this limitation, the Court said: “As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.”
What is the extent of the limitation? “Given the limited nature of the President’s authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be submitted to a plebiscite.

The most she could do is (to) submit these proposals as recommendations to Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.”

In stressing the limitation of the President’s power, the Court was laying down the ground to censure the President by declaring the MOA-AD unconstitutional based on Consensus 7, Governance in which the Court said the President had promised to the MILF to have the Constitution amended and on Consensus 4, Governance which grants “the BJE the status of an ‘associated state’” – a status “not recognized under the present Constitution”.

Paragraph 7

The Court said: “Paragraph (Consensus) 7 on Governance of the MOA-AD states, however,  that all provisions thereof which cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws ’shall come into force upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework.’ This stipulation … is mandatory for the GRP to effect the changes to the legal framework contemplated in the MOA-AD. …”

Is Consensus 7, Governance a promise?  Is it mandatory? Unless given a leeway, it is more likely than not. What was the intention of the GRP negotiators in agreeing with the MILF? Did they not know the limitation of the President’s power in relation to Article XVII, Sections 1 to 3 of the 1987 Constitution?

The well known constitutionalist, Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., in his Inquirer column (October 19) referred to this issue as a case of ambiguity  He said, “… in my contacts with members of the negotiating panel, I never got the impression that they wanted to by-pass Congress and to formulate self-executing provisions” although “… the document they produced lacks clarity.”

He explained: “In their sincere effort to produce language acceptable to people who do not accept our Constitution, their language engineering did not succeed in crafting a document free of ambiguity.” But it succeeded in building confidence. The room for a leeway lies there.

This has a parallel in the 1993-1996 GRP-MNLF peace talks. Chairman Nur Misuari, at the outset, rejected references to the Constitution and the ARMM Organic Act or R.A. 6734. GRP panel chairman Manuel T. Yan and President Fidel V. Ramos did not make an issue out of it. They went on with the negotiation without reference to the two documents. With confidence built, Misuari eventually accepted both the Constitution and R.A. 6734.

The Court never credited the President for the rapport the GRP negotiators had established with their MILF counterparts – calling their confidence-building efforts “whimsical, capricious” among others. Keeping the peace process open could not be achieved by confronting the MILF with the 1987 Constitution. No leeway, just limitations!

Intention

The Solicitor General failed to persuade the Court that the “unsigned MOA-AD is simply a list of consensus points subject to further negotiations and legislative enactments as well as constitutional processes” and that it “remains to be a proposal that does not automatically create legally demandable rights and obligations until the list of operative acts required have been duly complied with”

Lawyer Michael O. Mastura, senior member of the MILF panel, said that the MOA-AD is a “framework treaty” or agreement. He said its “working draft” would “explain the necessary ‘background’ for the GP-MILF peace process” including “the text, and the object and purpose of the treaty”.  Obviously, the Court did not find it necessary to examine the working draft.

Lawyer Sedfrey Candelaria, chief legal consultant of the GRP panel said – contrary to the Court’s opinion – that Consensus 7, Governance “may also explain the unique and non-self-executing character” of the MOA-AD. (Bold text supplied)

To explain, he quoted the first paragraph of Consensus 7 stating that: (a) the “Parties agree that the mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation of this MOA-AD shall be spelt out in the Comprehensive Compact” and (b) for the Parties “to mutually take such steps to enable it to occur effectively”.

The “(b)” is relevant to the second paragraph of Consensus 7, Governance which is the focus of the Court’s opinion and consistently referred to as “Paragraph 7″ — reflecting mutual confidence prevailing: “When the GRP and MILF Panels came to the negotiating table,” Candelaria said, “they were driven by what is possible and not by what is unthinkable.”

That in the negotiation of the Comprehensive Compact, positions and agreements in the MOA-AD could change, Candelaria quoted a practice of negotiating peace agreements: “By their nature, implementation agreements involve new negotiations … as parties test whether they can claw back concessions made at an early stage.”
Candelaria, it should be noted, distinguishes the MOA-AD from the Comprehensive Compact – the first being the “early stage” or “framework agreement” and the second the “implementing agreement”. During the negotiation of the Comprehensive Compact, the parties “can claw back” or reconsider “concessions made” in the MOA-AD as the tentative character of the principles, concepts and framework may evolve”.

Candelaria said that the intention of Paragraph (Consensus) 7, Governance “was never … to supplant the powers of a co-equal branch of the Government by entering into the MOA-AD”.  The GRP Panel had “the mandate to submit by way of recommendations to the Executive as a result of discussions at the negotiating table.  Thereafter, the Executive may consider these for appropriate coordination within the Legislative Branch which may now undertake the necessary legal processes”.

Lawyer Soliman M. Santos, Jr., a legal scholar deeply involved in the  MILF and MNLF peace negotiations with the Government, said that the Court’s opinion on Paragraph 7 “is highly debatable, to say the least” and that the “respondents were all along following a recommendatory mode vis-à-vis their principal, the GRP,” relative to the President’s powers to negotiate — and their limitation — as expounded by the Court.
“Paragraph 7,” he argued, “should not be seen negatively as ‘making the Constitution conform to the MOA-AD’ but rather as a matter of good faith implementation of peace agreements through constitutional processes that may include any necessary amendments or revisions of the Constitution, as would be the approach too with certain international obligations.”

No Leeway

Consensus 7, Governance “is inconsistent with the limits of the President’s authority to propose constitutional amendments”; it is a “virtual guarantee that the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of the Philippines will certainly be adjusted to conform to all the ‘consensus points’ found in the MOA-AD”; so “it must be struck down as unconstitutional”.

This gives no leeway for the President to exercise her “unique” power to negotiate a peace agreement with the MILF. This dooms the peace process.

To recapitulate, the Court correctly diagnosed the Mindanao conflict. The establishment of the ARMM according to the Constitution did not stop the fighting between the Moro rebels and the Government.  Given the leeway to negotiate peace, the President can end the conflict. In her 2008 State of the Nation Address, the President hailed the MOA-AD as the breakthrough.

But in declaring the MOA-AD as unconstitutional, the Court gave leeway to the opponents of the agreement, conceding none to the President. The Court did not explore pleadings, facts and circumstances that could have swayed its opinion into conceding to the President the necessary leeway.

The leeway is this: Allow the President to fully exercise her power by letting Paragraph 7 of Governance take its full course and spell out in the Comprehensive Compact “the mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation of this MOA-AD”.

The Court admonished the President for promising the MNLF to amend the Constitution and warned her she has no such power.  She can only recommend to Congress agreements that will require constitutional amendments for their implementation.

The admonition and warning are undeserved. The Court said the President cannot delegate powers that she does not have.  In like manner, she cannot promise to do what she has no power to do.   And, she cannot recommend to Congress any agreement that will amend the Constitution until the signing of the Comprehensive

Compact.

That’s water under the bridge but it calls for reflection.  (To Be Continued) (

“Comment” is Mr. Patricio P. Diaz’ column for MindaViews, the opinion section of MindaNews. Mr. Diaz is the recipient of a “Lifetime Achievement Award” from the Titus Brandsma for his “commitment to education and public information to Mindanawons as Journalist, Educator and Peace Advocate.” You may e-mail your comments to patpdiaz@mindanews.comThis e-mail address is being protected from spam bots, you need JavaScript enabled to view it ).

DAVAO CITY (MindaNews/14 October) – The Supreme Court has ruled as unconstitutional by a vote of 8-7, the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), abs-cbnnews.com reported.

“The minority’s position was to declare the anti-MOA petitions as moot since the Palace has already decided not to pursue the signing of the agreement following a public backlash. This would have given the Palace a graceful exit, if not, defeat,” abs-cbnnews.com said.

Initialed in Kuala Lumpur on July 27 by government peace panel chair Rodolfo Garcia and Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process Hermogenes Esperon and MILF peace panel chair Mohagher Iqbal, the MOA-AD was scheduled for formal signing on August 5 but the signing rites were cancelled when the Supreme Court issued afternoon of August 4, a temporary restraining order (TRO) preventing the government peace panel chair and the Foreign Affairs secretary from signing the document.

Since then, half a million villagers have fled to evacuation centers as the military launched pursuit  operations against  alleged renegade MILF commanders Umbra Kato, Bravo and Pangalian in North Cotabato, Maguindanao, Lanao del Norte and the MILF attacked three towns in Lanao del Norte and two in Sarangani province.

Calling the SC decision “a triumph of the people,” North Cotabato Vice Governor Emmanuel Pinol, who first filed the petition for a TRO hailed the SC ruling, referring to today as “an extra-ordinary day in our lives in savoring what for us is a manifestation of a long cherished belief that power truly resides in the people.”

”What started as a parochial struggle to protect the territorial integrity of the Province of North Cotabato and invoke the Constitutional Right of the people to know what government is doing on their behalf has become part of our national history,” he said in an e-mailed press statement, adding, that in a “strongly worded decision, the Supreme Court also admonished the government for ignoring the need for transparency and consultations with the people.”

Iligan City mayor Lawrence Cruz told MindaNews “it’s a guarded happiness.”

“We are happy the Court ruled in our favor. This only shows that our objection was not unreasonable, it was not unfair, not emotional, we were not being anti-Moro about it and that there was something wrong in how the MOA was crafted and certain vested, permanent rights were going to be trampled upon if pushed through. To me, it would have been an instrument of war instead of peace,” Cruz said.

MILF peace panel chair Mohagher Iqbal told MindaNews the SC decision has “no bearing to the MILF.”

“There is no problem (for the MILF). We are not part of the case. The Supreme Court is not a party to the MOA-AD. But GRP remains a party and is bound by it.” he said.

“The ruling is an indication that this country can’t put its act together. MILF is right to never negotiate on the basis of the Constitution.  It is not a level playing field,” Iqbal said.
Lawyer Datu Michael Mastura, told MindaNews he doesn’t have a copy of the Supreme Court ruling and has not seen a copy of the ruling  but “either way, the bottomline is that the SC decision does not resolve the armed conflict.”

“It’s a legalese game between government and the opposition. But there is still armed conflict. No negotiations, no political settlement,” he said.

“What else is new? Government had abandoned the MOA before the Supreme Court decision. The bottomline is SC has not resolved the armed conflict. There is no political settlement,” he added.

“We really need an international guarantee, protocol. Whatever is negotiated should be implemented,” Mastura said. 

Lawyer Mary Ann Arnado, secretary-general of the Mindanao Peoples’ Caucus, said, “I guess that’s it. That’s the end of the peace process as far as this government is concerned. The Supreme Court has just foreclosed all possible peaceful means of resolving the armed conflict in Mindanao.”

Prof. Abhoud Syed Lingga, executive director of the Institute of Bangsamoro Studies, said the Supreme Court ruling “puts to an end efforts of the Bangsamoro people to seek domestic remedies to the historical and moral injustices committed against them.”

“Staying with the Republic of the Philippines now becomes untenable, and separation appears as the only viable option left to the Bangsamoro people,” Lingga said.

The SC ruling, he added, is setting a “bad precedent in the use of negotiations in conflict resolutions. It is disincentive to those who fight governments to negotiate if what are agreed upon are thrown to the trash can.”

The government dissolved its peace panel on September 3 and announced it would negotiate with armed groups only on the basis of DDR (demobilization, disarmament and reintegration). (Carolyn O. Arguillas/MindaNews)

Part 2 of a series
GENERAL SANTOS CITY (MindaNews/9 Oct) – The last issue ended posing the puzzle: Will the new policy address effectively the Mindanao problem deeply rooted in the Moro demand for their ancestral domain?
The logic behind the puzzle is plain common sense: If the new policy fails to effectively address the root of the Mindanao problem, it will not solve the problem.

Complicated

The peace process will continue. This commitment is a response to an all-out demand – from the Moros and peace groups in Mindanao, from some opponents and critics of the MOA-AD — showing they like peace but not the price — and from concerned members of the international community. How it will continue, though, is unclear.
Will the process still focus on talks with the MILF or refocus to dialogues with communities as President Arroyo stated (INQUIRER.net, August 22)? Evidently, the government is taking time in deciding how to proceed. The haste in formulating and announcing the new policy pacified the critics and opponents of the MOA-AD but has put the Arroyo government in a new dilemma.
After weeks of media silence, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita said the possible revival of the peace talks was taken up at the National Security Council-Cabinet meeting last October 7 in response to “the clamor from a few sectors from Mindanao”   (philstar.com, October . He emphasized that “the calls must be studied in the light of the new” policy.
Not only the who-focus but, much more, the what- and the how-focuses will make the peace process complicated. President Arroyo stated: “The focus of our talks shall shift from the armed groups to the communities. From negotiations, our focus shall shift to dialogues with the communities or government conducting authentic conversations or dialogues with the people.” To make peace with the armed groups, talk to the communities?
And, the government will negotiate from strength: “From now on, our engagement with all armed groups shall be about DDR … about the people and government telling armed groups to give up the armed struggle.” Does DDR work as simply as this?
Let us take a close look into the new policy.
Out of Focus
When the camera is out of focus, the picture is blurred. And blurred will be the prospects of an out-of-focus negotiation.
What is the ultimate end of the peace negotiation? To address the complaints, the roots of the Mindanao problem. Common sense dictates that the negotiation should be with the rebels, the complainants – the MILF. And the focus should continue to be on the MOA-AD which, in the 3-year, 8-month GRP-MILF deliberation, crystallized the root problems and the solutions.
Where is the logic of having dialogues with the communities? Which communities – Muslim, Christian, Lumad or all three? They may be conflict-affected; but they are not parties to the conflict – the rebellion. They are not the rebels – not the complainants seeking solutions to the root problems.
These communities have big stake in the peace. Perhaps, together with the peace advocates, they can help the government negotiate with the rebels. They can dialogue with the government but they cannot speak for the rebels – not acting as substitute or alternative to the MILF, the party in conflict with the government. Can they tell the rebels to give up the rebellion?
Diverse Concerns
What will these communities talk about in their dialogues with the government? Diverse matters as diverse as their concerns. These will focus on socio-economic needs, services and various forms of assistance.
But these concerns are not new. These may have already been brought to the attention of the government for the nth time – roads, schools, water system, irrigation, land problems, jobs, illiteracy, health, poverty ad infinitum. Sure to a tee, the dialogues will be dramatized, climaxing in promises to the happiness of everyone.
Some promises will be fulfilled. But even if all will be granted, they will only prune not uproot the problem. That’s how the MILF will see these – counterinsurgency measures. The MILF do not consider the Moro problem as basically poverty and ignorance but as their root. To paraphrase a saying, the need is not fish but the skill to catch fish.
Through dialogues, the Moro communities will only receive trickles from what Manila amasses from Mindanao. With political authority over their ancestral domain, the MILF envision the Moros to be the masters of their own destiny. Back to the paraphrase, they will develop their own fishing grounds and catch their own fish – not beg from Manila for bones and heads.
The diverse concerns of the communities will only blur the real focus – the root concern.
About DDR
As stated by President Arroyo, (1) the focus of our talks will shift from the armed groups to the communities; and, (2) our engagement with all armed groups shall be about DDR. What does the President mean by “engagement”? This is vital to the understanding of the new policy.
The word in context takes the military, not the social, meaning. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration happen as either a provision of a political agreement or a term of surrender. This should have been the final provision in the comprehensive
compact. With the MOA-AD disowned and the CC aborted, how will the new policy go about the DDR?
Will it be this way? In the dialogues with the Moro, Christian and Lumad communities, the government discusses the DDR. Convinced that the DDR will bring about peace, these communities will join the government, in the words of President Arroyo in “telling the (MILF) to give up the armed struggle”.
Outside of the political agreement, the DDR will not address the root of the Moro or Mindanao problem. It is the consequence, not the antecedent, of the political settlement. At this time, can it be imposed as a term of surrender? An imposition only deepens the root.
By the new policy, does President Arroyo mean to resume peace negotiation with the MILF or does she really mean to impose the DDR to them? “Engagement” connotes imposition.
Resumption
The October 7 report appears to show that the Arroyo government cannot just ignore the calls for the resumption of the peace talks with the MILF. The calls also indicate that the Mindanao peace groups and Moro communities prefer that the government resume the talks with the MILF to having dialogue with them.
But the conditions for the resumption according to the new policy are not encouraging. They are bound to be rejected by the MILF. First, the MOA-AD will only be one of the references. Second, the surrender of the three commanders as a must-condition for the resumption has already been rejected by the MILF.
How will the MOA-AD fare as a reference? The GRP panel will include representatives from sectors hostile to the MOA-AD. This will ensure the exclusion of the vision of the ancestral domain and the root of the Moro problem from the negotiation. How can the peace talks under these circumstances address the root of the Moro or Mindanao problem?
Will there be a new talking framework centered on DDR? It’s unthinkable that the MILF agree to waste the 11-year negotiation and the incremental agreements leading to the MOA-AD that, together with its mode of implementation, will be embodied in the comprehensive compact. The MILF has served notice that the talks, if resumed, willstart from the MOA-AD and on to the CC.
How can the talks resume under contradictory conditions?
Back to the question: “Will the new policy address effectively the Mindanao problem deeply rooted in the Moro demand for their ancestral domain?” The answer is obvious.
Despite the intimidating odds, the MOA-AD is the only option left. (To be continued)

(”Comment” is Mr. Patricio P. Diaz’ column for MindaViews, the opinion section of MindaNews. The Titus Brandsma Media Awards recently honored Mr. Diaz with a “Lifetime Achievement Award” for his “commitment to education and public information to Mindanawons as Journalist, Educator and Peace Advocate.” You can reach him at patpdiazgsc@yahoo.comThis e-mail address is being protected from spam bots, you need JavaScript enabled to view it .)

PENANG, Malaysia (MindaNews/27 September) — The former president Joseph Estrada declared an “all-out-war” against the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in 2000 that lasted for nine months.

A perfect icon for war, he made good his acting as a soldier-president fully dressed in green fatigue leading his military troops to annihilate the rebels. And just as fitting as a war hero, for every military success, he went to visit the captured MILF camps and feasted on victory.

The Philippine media had a field day. They had great pictures of war - Estrada as the superstar- complete with his sensational war statements like, “pupulbusin natin sila.”

Those were very painful days for every Moro—whether they were in Mindanao, Manila, or elsewhere. It was painful because the greatest casualties had been the vast majority of the Moro people, besides the military soldiers of course.

Not only did the war bring out physical affliction and hardship, it also opened deep wounds of discrimination and biases. While, at that time, I may have been fully integrated to the Philippine society having grown up in Manila, the reality of the conflict in Mindanao did not escape me.

Those nine months of horror became a baptism of fire for me. Suddenly the words “Abu Sayyaf”, “Camp Abubakar”, “MNLF, MILF” (without necessarily knowing the difference) had become familiar lingo to the Filipino society to the point of using it as part of daily humour. My own friends, and even acquaintances, would ask me about some of these words. Sometimes, they would jokingly say, “Do you own Camp Abubakar?” and most of the time, I would laugh with them. However, after a while, I stopped laughing at these jokes or insinuations. Instead, I started to feel a sense of pain and unhappiness on how the Moro identity and the rest of the Moro people are generally viewed in Manila. It made me think how callous society can be to think that the war that is being waged in Mindanao is an acceptable reality…that Estrada is right in crushing the Moro rebels at all costs in order to achieve peace in Mindanao.

The “all-out-war” context made me realize that perhaps, what peace really means to President Estrada, and all those who support his view, is for the Moro people to be banished from their own homeland.

For the very first time, I actually felt something that none of my other Filipino friends seemed to understand. Later on, it was only with my Moro friends with whom I had found the same feelings of frustration and great concern for the plight of the communities bombarded by deafening sound of aerial bombings and exchanges of firefights.

To the majority of the people of Manila, the war in Mindanao was so distant and amusing as another cinematic feat of an actor-president—it was so casual and entertaining just like watching a movie.

While among my Moro friends and families, it was like we are made to understand that the life and future of a Moro is not as valuable as another Filipino. And that if we are to survive in Mindanao and in the Philippines, we would have to live by the dominant culture, identity, and other social systems. Sadly, this would also mean that we can only be contented with vague recognition among my Filipino friends that I must have come from some sort of Moro royalty (a usual generalization among Filipinos in Manila when they meet a Moro person as they view this as exotic), while the rest of their memory would be filled with the never-ending war in Mindanao, and how the Moro areas remain to be the last frontier of the country.

Undeniably, the war in Mindanao has brought me back to my ancestors’ history. It did not only help renew my own identity as a Moro, but it also inspired me to search for solutions to the problems that continue to plague us in Mindanao. While in the beginning I subscribed to the notion that is education and development that would bring about a better future for the Moro people (having been trained in development work), I have also come to understand that this will not end the injustices that we will continue to experience under the Philippine State.

Our historical and ongoing relationship with the State has not shown any change for the better, but instead has worsened the condition of our communities. Consequentially, the “all-out-war” and all other succeeding armed conflict waged by the State will continue to make the people poorer, hopeless, and as a natural impact, it is these wars that further marginalize our status and value as a people in their very own homeland.

Granting after every war, the State does mobilize all its resources to bring education and development to Mindanao, does it actually guarantee the Moro people of being fairly treated as decision makers of their own destinies? Or will it continue to promote an outsider’s intervention mode of development with little respect of what the people actually want for themselves? Will this kind of development bring us forward to a future of reconciliation in spite of an absence of a closure from our violent and unjust history as a result of the conflict?

It is therefore upon these questions that I have shifted my view to a need for conflict resolution in Mindanao through peaceful means in contrast to the tactical development oriented solution. There is no other way but for the State and the Moro people to forge a peace agreement and a new relationship for the future. There is no easy road to peace, and surely, any use of military means will take us a much longer path ahead.

As soon as the spirit of Edsa 2 succeeded in overthrowing president Estrada, his successor, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was quick to reverse a pro-war stance to an “all-out-peace” government policy towards all the revolutionary groups, including the MILF. I was one of those in euphoria. After all, I, too, took part in Edsa 2 and helped her become president overnight.

However, since the peace negotiations between the government and the MILF commenced in 2001 with Malaysia as its third party facilitator, it had been a very difficult process. We have witnessed the forging of some of the initial agreements and having these agreements implemented, again, with much more difficulties (like the establishment of the Bangsamoro Development Agency) which idea was welcomed with mixed reactions by civil society itself in the beginning.

While the peace talks were conducted steadily, the armed violence that is escalated from time to time had threatened the whole process. It was only up until the International Monitoring Team (IMT) was deployed that we saw a more stable ceasefire situation in Mindanao. The relative peace had bought us some dividends and had enabled more development initiatives by various NGOs, government agencies, and donor agencies. This period has also allowed increased activities on the promotion of peace education and peacebuilding work by civil society groups. These two strategies are very significant foundations because these will ensure sustainable peace in Mindanao.

President Gloria Arroyo’s management of the conflict in Mindanao and her goal for achieving peace with both the MILF and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) has always been a puzzle. Although she appears to give her support to her government panel of peace negotiators and other agencies working towards her peace agenda, at the same time, she has been thrifty in unequivocally declaring her priority for peace in Mindanao.

Instead, she has always been very vocal in throwing her support to political allies and advisers who are more comfortable in using military power as a means to demonstrate her strength as a national leader.

In her 2008 State of the Nation Address, there were six lines dedicated that mainly asks the legislative bodies to support a move for constitutional changes that will hopefully implement the government’s peace deal with the MILF.

However, knowing that there is already a deep resistance towards chacha, she couldn’t get any further by assuring that her intentions are clear–to bring peace to Mindanao, and not to use this as part of her own political agenda.

Another great example is how she embarked on her succeeding reactions and actions upon the stopping of the signing of an agreement with the MILF as caused by a temporary restraining order in the Supreme Court.

When her own government peace panel, OPAPP, and secretary for Foreign Affairs are put in an embarrassing situation arriving in Putrajaya, Malaysia but not being able to deliver its commitment, she has embarrassed her own leadership all the more when she allows her Solicitor General to tell the Supreme Court that the officials sent to Putrajaya did not have her authority to sign any agreement. As the Arroyo administration takes the heat of opposition to the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain from political enemies and from its own allies, it found a great opportunity, again, to demonstrate its “strong leadership” by waging war with the MILF.

The president had to blame and fire its own peace negotiators, suspend the peace talks, and challenge the MILF to surrender (its commanders and accept an immediate DDR implementation) if it wants to move for peace.

And recently this September, while many peoples from Mindanao (as part of the Mindanao People’s Caucus advocacy) appeal to her to put a stop on the ongoing military offensives as it destroys homes and kills innocent civilians, she insists that this has to be done to protect the people and the territorial integrity of the country.

The president’s view is not unique, it is a view she has taken together with millions of Filipinos who maintains their firm belief that the Moro people can only be tamed by the use of force. It is a view that articulates well how the MILF, as the governments counterpart party in the peace negotiations, will only be worthy if it first accepts the latter’s own conditions and terms and puts itself at the mercy of the powerful Philippine military. It is also a view that upholds no equitable respect to the lives of innocent civilians who are often the collateral damage (mostly Moros) of this war.

Lastly, the President’s statement and actions further divides by playing the “good cop, bad cop” game in which it allows the media and the opinion of the major influencers in Manila to capitalize on the miseries and trauma of conflict and unrest in Mindanao.

We should not lose sight that this war has been provoked by local disputes and escalated by traditional leaders who were opposing the MOA-AD.

It had become a communal conflict participated by not only some MILF commanders but also by CAFGUs and CVOs of local politicians. It was only a matter of time that these peace spoilers had succeeded in making President Arroyo take a stand—whether she values her commitments with the MILF (in their peace process), or her political allies and constituencies. The rest of it is history as we reach a full circle of this culture of war that president Arroyo’s leadership continues to nurture. How then, can Philippine leaders expect the Moro people to believe in a promise for peace in Mindanao when they continue to become the victims of military rule and pawns of national and local politicking?

I have no regrets about my commitment to working for peace in Mindanao. It has taught me many life lessons and has made me proud of my identity and history—something I did not get while being assimilated as a Filipino in Manila. It has allowed me to build on more honest and meaningful relationships with the indigenous peoples and Christians in Mindanao, and in Manila, with mutual respect and acceptance. It has earned me new friends, who, this time, do understand how I feel when another war is waged in Mindanao—mostly because they, too, have found themselves to be stakeholders in this conflict and in this never-ending search for peace.

Although leaders like presidents Estrada and Arroyo have never learned their lessons well with Mindanao, I console myself by being hopeful that their values and judgment cannot be the long lasting norm. Should the Filipino society truly want meaningful change, it would have to recognize that it is a nation of diverse peoples. And as a credible and strong nation that is part of the international community of nations, it must fully embrace a culture of peace, not war, as its societal value.

As the end of the month of Ramadhan brings us to the celebration of the Eid’l Fitre, I wish to end this article with the following verses from the Quran. May be all be blessed!

“But if the enemy incline towards peace, do you (also) incline towards peace, and trust in God: for He is the One that hears and knows (all things). Should they intend to deceive you,–verily God suffices you: He it is that has strengthened  you with His aid and with (the company of) the Believers; And (moreover) He has put affection between their hearts: not if you had spent all that is in the earth, could have produced that affection, but God has done it: for He is Exalted I might, Wise. O Prophet! Sufficient unto you is God, –(unto you) and unto those who follow you among the Believers.—Holy Quran:  8: 61-64

 [Mindanawon Abroad is MindaNews’ effort to link up with Mindanawons overseas who would like to share their experiences in their adopted countries, the countries they’re presently working in, their growing up years or homecomings in Mindanao, their hopes and dreams and suggestions for Our Mindanao  Ayesah Abubakar is the coordinator of the Mindanao Peace Program at the Research & Education for Peace Universiti Sains Malaysia or REPUSM in Penang, Malaysia. E-mail  ayesah@bangsamoro.comThis e-mail address is being protected from spam bots, you need JavaScript enabled to view it ]

ILIGAN CITY (MindaNews/23 September) – Fourteen years ago, the city government honored Mindanao historian Professor Rudy Rodil as a “Buotang Iliganon” (good citizen of Iligan) for his membership in the government peace panel that forged a peace agreement with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).

Earlier this month, the city council passed a resolution declaring Rodil a persona non grata for his alleged participation in the “grand conspiracy to fool the people, cut Iligan City into pieces and of the biggest blunder the Philippine government has ever made which is the carving and giving of a big chunk of Mindanao to a rebel group, just to attain the simple word ‘peace.’”

The resolution was alluding to the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) the signing of which was stalled after the Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order against it.

Rodil was vice chair of the government peace panel in talks with the MILF.

“It hurts,” Saturnina Rodil, English professor at Mindanao State University-Iligan Institute of Technology and Rodil’s wife, said of the declaration.

“The resolution is full of hate, anger and is generating hate. It truly hurts. We are taking it seriously but we are not letting it affect us. I said ‘us and we’ because I cannot separate myself from Ompong (Rudy),” she said.

But Rodil said she holds no rancor in her heart for the local officials.

“We wish them (local officials) and their families good health and happiness,” she said

She said many Iliganons do not have limited views and that they would eventually realize that peace not war is the best option.

She added that her husband had appeared twice before the city council whose members ignored his statements and did not show any respect for him even if reporters were around.

The third invitation asked him to “explain to the city council why he shouldn’t be declared persona non grata.”

Civil society leaders last week marked the International Day of Peace in Cagayan de Oro City with a conference that honored Rudil for his contribution to the peace process as a member of the government peace panel

Rodil’s wife said the resolution declaring him a persona non grata was read during the program to provide context but that the conference participants ignored it.

“Ompong is a whole lot busier than he was with the panel,” she revealed. “He is too involved in many activities now and has numerous speaking engagements, one after the other.”

She on the other hand has been involved in providing relief and psychosocial therapy to war-torn communities.

Mary Ann Arnado of the Mindanao People’s Caucus told participants to a peace conference here Monday not to be silent on the fate of Rodil.

The conference was supported by the government and the UNDP Act for Peace Programme.

“Rodil merely performed his mandate as member of the peace panel. I challenge the city council of Iligan to declare President Arroyo as persona non grata because it’s from her where Rodil got his mandate,” Arnado said.

“The civil society must back up Rodil who was just loyal to what he ought to do as part of the negotiating team. We will not just demand to stop the war, not just call for a ceasefire but must also find a resolution to our problem so that we will not end up in a cycle of violence,” she explained. 

“This is not the time to blame each other. We will work for a peace that is not imposed but is anchored on justice,” she added.

“Rodil deserves to be honored as we have honored him recently for his contributions in the peace process,” said Regina Antequisa, executive director of Ecoweb Inc. who also attended the conference. 

“There is a need to raise the level of people’s awareness on the impact of the conflict and to encourage community leaders and members to participate in the efforts to positively promote peace and in resolving conflict,” she said. (Violeta M. Gloria/MindaNews)