Part 3 of a series
GENERAL SANTOS CITY (MindaNews/14 Oct) — Back to the question: “Will the new policy address effectively the Mindanao problem deeply rooted in the Moro demand for their ancestral domain?” The answer is obvious.

The Only Option

Despite the intimidating odds, the MOA-AD is the only option that can address effectively the Mindanao problem. To reiterate an earlier question: What can the MOA-AD do that the new policy cannot? Or, to reword it: What is the MOA-AD that the new policy is not?

Most people, including the Moros, may be unaware that the MOA-AD has synthesized all previous efforts of Moro leaders to recover their lost heritage. It reflects the agitation of Moro leaders for a separate state; the June 9, 1921 Sulu Petition; the February 1, 1924 Dansalan Declaration; Datu Udtog Matalam’s MIM Manifesto; the Tripoli Agreement of 1976; the Final Peace Agreement of 1996; and R.A. 6734 as amended by R.A. 9054.

The MOA-AD complements those efforts, supplements their inadequacies, and as one new document — strengthened by international laws, treaties and movements espousing minority and human rights — presents a rallying cause for Moro unity as “Bangsamoro” and appeals to the Philippine government and Filipino people for understanding and, when necessary, the amendment of the Constitution to give the Moros the long-time elusive justice.

Unfortunately, the MOA-AD has been misunderstood — even by Moro leaders who, in their high positions, could have stood in Congress and other national forums to put it in proper historical and contemporary perspectives. Their silence reverberates. The new peace policy is irrelevant to the Moro aspirations synthesized in the MOA-AD. We will elaborate later.

Synthesis

As early as 1910, Moro leaders addressed to American officials their desire for Mindanao to be handed back to them as a state or a province independent of the Philippines composed of the Visayas and Luzon. This was the principal demand of the Sulu Petition and the Dansalan Declaration.

The same sentiment Congressman Ombra Amilbangsa expressed in House Bill 5682 that he filed in Congress in 1961 for the grant of independence to the province of Sulu. The bill, not expected to be passed, was archived. But it had achieved its purpose – to make known the pent-up Moro aspiration.

Seven years later, on May 1, 1968, Datu Udtog Matalam launched the Muslim Independence Movement with the publication of the MIM Manifesto in The Manila Times. (The first “M” was later changed to “Mindanao”.) Later, Cong. Salipada K. Pendatun, Datu Udtog’s brother-in-law, clarified that the MIM was only meant to draw national attention to the plight of the Moros.

Independence of Mindanao and Sulu was the original demand of the united MNLF. But in the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, they had to settle for regional autonomy in deference to the OIC that in the 1974 Kuala Lumpur ICFM Resolution No. 18 urged the Philippines to negotiate with the Muslim leaders a political solution to “the plight of the Filipino Muslims within the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines”.

The Marcos Regional Autonomous Governments IX and XII (1979-1989) under PD 1618 were based on the 1976 Tripoli Agreement; and, so is the ARMM (1989 to the present). Obviously, the 1976 TA motivated the autonomy provisions of the 1987 Constitution and was infused into the drafts of R.A. 6734, the original ARMM Organic Act. The 1996 FPA enacted into R.A. 9054 “is the full implementation” of the 1976 TA. (1996 FPA, Paragraph 153)

Those previous efforts of Moro leaders, dating back to the first decade of 1900, to recover the lost Moro heritage are reflected in the Concepts and Principles of the MOA-AD. While there is no demand for independence in the MOA-AD, it creates the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity as an autonomy more autonomous than the ARMM.

Significant

It is significant — while intriguing — to note that the 1976 TA, the 1996 FPA, R.A. 6734 and R.A. 9054 are among the terms of reference in the negotiation of the Ancestral Domain; yet, the MILF does not recognize the ARMM. Where’s the logic in recognizing the causes but rejecting the effect? At a glance, it does not make sense.

This indicates that the four instruments contain, to some degree, essential principles of autonomy but are inadequate in their implementation. Since these instruments are in tune with the 1987 Constitution, the MOA-AD – if out of tune – can be attuned to it notwithstanding its exclusion as a term of reference. Had the critics and opponents of the MOA-AD seen the significant, not only the intrigue, the constitutional issue could have been tempered down.

Clearly, the MOA-AD boldly asserts what the Muslim Autonomy should be. In “Concepts and Principles”, it lays down the principles of this autonomy; in “Territory”, “Resources”, and “Governance”, it addresses the inadequacies of autonomy as provided in the four instruments and seen in the ARMM.

RAG and ARMM

The Muslim Autonomy took form in the 1976 Tripoli Agreement — a three-part agreement on (1) the general principle in the establishment of the autonomy; (2) the area of autonomy or territory; and (3) the substantive and transitory provisions. 

The area of the autonomy was defined only as consisting of the 13 provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga del Norte, North Cotabato, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Davao del Sur, South Cotabato and Palawan, and all the “cities and villages situated” in them.

The understanding of the MNLF was that President Ferdinand E. Marcos would decree the creation of this area into a Muslim autonomy to be handed to them. But two provisions that Marcos exploited deflated their expectation. It appeared that they had taken these for granted:

·               The First Part provided for “The establishment of Autonomy in the Southern Philippines within

         the realm of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.” 

·         Paragraph 16 of the Third Part provided: “The Government of the Philippines shall take all necessary constitutional processes for the implementation of the entire Agreement.”

Contrary to the MNLF protestations, these two provisions subjected the establishment of the autonomy to the plebiscite according to the Constitution. Under Marcos, three provinces opted out of RAG IX and XII. As the same provisions were essentially adopted in the 1987 Constitution and in the 1996 FPA, only four provinces and no city joined the first ARMM (1989-2001); in the 2001 plebiscite, the ARMM expanded to five provinces and one city.

Instead of questioning the territorial composition of the ARMM, the MILF adopted it as the core area of the BJE, including six municipalities of Lanao del Norte that voted to join the ARMM in the 2001. Had the 1987 Constitution and the 1996 FPA been strictly followed, the six would have been part of the ARMM — this appearing as the subtle message of the MOA-AD.

The BJE

However, the MOA-AD did more than the 1976 TA. It defined the BJE territory as to (1) its foundation and (2) its limits. By this, the MILF effectively asserted that what they are claiming is just part of their ancestral domain – not a grant from the government — that by historical right is their own. This, the MNLF failed to assert in either the 1976 TA or in the 1996 FPA.

The ancestral domain as “the foundation of the Bangsamoro homeland” has two fundamental significance: (1) “to address the Bangsamoro people’s humanitarian and economic needs as well as their political aspirations” and (2) to “represent the social, cultural and political identity and pride of all the Bangsamoro people”. 

The ancestral domain is not a grant from the government. “Ownership of the homeland is vested exclusively in them by virtue of their prior rights of occupation that had inhered in them as sizeable bodies of people, delimited by their ancestors since time immemorial, and being the first politically organized dominant occupants.” 

This definition in Consensus 2, Concepts and Principles of the MOA-AD instills self-pride in the BJE, not dependence as seen in the ARMM today whose leaders look up patronizingly to Malacañang for political and economic support and in gratitude for the grant of autonomy. The MOA-AD lays down the means for the Bangsamoro people to rise on their own feet, not to be beholden to Manila under the BJE.

Territorial Limits

In Consensus 1, Territory, the limits of ancestral domain is defined as “the land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domain, and the aerial domain, the atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region”. This the critics and opponents of the MOA-AD view with disdain.

However, the BJE is limited to the ARMM and six municipalities of Lanao del Norte as the core area (Territory, 2.c.) and to other municipalities and barangays that will elect later to join the BJE (Territory, 2.d.). While Consensus 2.d, Territorys. is vehemently opposed, BJE’s territorial limits evokes some degree of magnanimity on the part of the MILF for not demanding the full return of what by historical right is theirs – sneered at by the MOA-AD critics and opponents.

When the MNLF settled for the 13-province autonomy in the 1976 TA and 1996 FPA, they abandoned their claim over Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan. As defined in Concepts and Principles of the MOA-AD, the Ancestral Domain is the MILF’s way of asserting the Moro historical rights over the entire Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan and having it acknowledged. 

Jurisdiction

By Consensus 6, Concepts and Principles, reiterated in Consensus 1, Territory, the authority and jurisdiction of BJE “over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral lands” are total raising the fear that at an opportune time the Moros will demand to repossess the entire Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan. The fixing of the territorial limits of BJE should hopefully assuage that fear. 

In the practical sense, the fixing is necessary. How can a regional autonomy be autonomous if it doesn’t clearly and fully know its political and economic authority and jurisdiction? Within the fixed territory, the BJE has the authority and jurisdiction to fully develop all the economic resources in the ancestral domain.

As provided in the 1976 TA and the 1987 Constitution, the jurisdiction of the ARMM is limited to the boundaries of the component provinces and cities. In the MOA-AD, the jurisdiction of the BJE extends to its internal and territorial waters, to the land and spaces below and under. This has stirred up protests.

However, it should be asked: Does the constriction of the autonomous region’s jurisdiction

over its territory not adversely affect its autonomy? (To Be Continued)

(”Comment” is Mr. Patricio P. Diaz’ column for MindaViews, the opinion section of MindaNews. The Titus Brandsma Media Awards recently honored Mr. Diaz with a “Lifetime Achievement Award” for his “commitment to education and public information to Mindanawons as Journalist, Educator and Peace Advocate.” You can reach him at patpdiazgsc@yahoo.com.This e-mail address is being protected from spam bots, you need JavaScript enabled to view it )