Part 2 of a series
GENERAL SANTOS CITY (MindaNews/9 Oct) – The last issue ended posing the puzzle: Will the new policy address effectively the Mindanao problem deeply rooted in the Moro demand for their ancestral domain?
The logic behind the puzzle is plain common sense: If the new policy fails to effectively address the root of the Mindanao problem, it will not solve the problem.

Complicated

The peace process will continue. This commitment is a response to an all-out demand – from the Moros and peace groups in Mindanao, from some opponents and critics of the MOA-AD — showing they like peace but not the price — and from concerned members of the international community. How it will continue, though, is unclear.
Will the process still focus on talks with the MILF or refocus to dialogues with communities as President Arroyo stated (INQUIRER.net, August 22)? Evidently, the government is taking time in deciding how to proceed. The haste in formulating and announcing the new policy pacified the critics and opponents of the MOA-AD but has put the Arroyo government in a new dilemma.
After weeks of media silence, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita said the possible revival of the peace talks was taken up at the National Security Council-Cabinet meeting last October 7 in response to “the clamor from a few sectors from Mindanao”   (philstar.com, October . He emphasized that “the calls must be studied in the light of the new” policy.
Not only the who-focus but, much more, the what- and the how-focuses will make the peace process complicated. President Arroyo stated: “The focus of our talks shall shift from the armed groups to the communities. From negotiations, our focus shall shift to dialogues with the communities or government conducting authentic conversations or dialogues with the people.” To make peace with the armed groups, talk to the communities?
And, the government will negotiate from strength: “From now on, our engagement with all armed groups shall be about DDR … about the people and government telling armed groups to give up the armed struggle.” Does DDR work as simply as this?
Let us take a close look into the new policy.
Out of Focus
When the camera is out of focus, the picture is blurred. And blurred will be the prospects of an out-of-focus negotiation.
What is the ultimate end of the peace negotiation? To address the complaints, the roots of the Mindanao problem. Common sense dictates that the negotiation should be with the rebels, the complainants – the MILF. And the focus should continue to be on the MOA-AD which, in the 3-year, 8-month GRP-MILF deliberation, crystallized the root problems and the solutions.
Where is the logic of having dialogues with the communities? Which communities – Muslim, Christian, Lumad or all three? They may be conflict-affected; but they are not parties to the conflict – the rebellion. They are not the rebels – not the complainants seeking solutions to the root problems.
These communities have big stake in the peace. Perhaps, together with the peace advocates, they can help the government negotiate with the rebels. They can dialogue with the government but they cannot speak for the rebels – not acting as substitute or alternative to the MILF, the party in conflict with the government. Can they tell the rebels to give up the rebellion?
Diverse Concerns
What will these communities talk about in their dialogues with the government? Diverse matters as diverse as their concerns. These will focus on socio-economic needs, services and various forms of assistance.
But these concerns are not new. These may have already been brought to the attention of the government for the nth time – roads, schools, water system, irrigation, land problems, jobs, illiteracy, health, poverty ad infinitum. Sure to a tee, the dialogues will be dramatized, climaxing in promises to the happiness of everyone.
Some promises will be fulfilled. But even if all will be granted, they will only prune not uproot the problem. That’s how the MILF will see these – counterinsurgency measures. The MILF do not consider the Moro problem as basically poverty and ignorance but as their root. To paraphrase a saying, the need is not fish but the skill to catch fish.
Through dialogues, the Moro communities will only receive trickles from what Manila amasses from Mindanao. With political authority over their ancestral domain, the MILF envision the Moros to be the masters of their own destiny. Back to the paraphrase, they will develop their own fishing grounds and catch their own fish – not beg from Manila for bones and heads.
The diverse concerns of the communities will only blur the real focus – the root concern.
About DDR
As stated by President Arroyo, (1) the focus of our talks will shift from the armed groups to the communities; and, (2) our engagement with all armed groups shall be about DDR. What does the President mean by “engagement”? This is vital to the understanding of the new policy.
The word in context takes the military, not the social, meaning. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration happen as either a provision of a political agreement or a term of surrender. This should have been the final provision in the comprehensive
compact. With the MOA-AD disowned and the CC aborted, how will the new policy go about the DDR?
Will it be this way? In the dialogues with the Moro, Christian and Lumad communities, the government discusses the DDR. Convinced that the DDR will bring about peace, these communities will join the government, in the words of President Arroyo in “telling the (MILF) to give up the armed struggle”.
Outside of the political agreement, the DDR will not address the root of the Moro or Mindanao problem. It is the consequence, not the antecedent, of the political settlement. At this time, can it be imposed as a term of surrender? An imposition only deepens the root.
By the new policy, does President Arroyo mean to resume peace negotiation with the MILF or does she really mean to impose the DDR to them? “Engagement” connotes imposition.
Resumption
The October 7 report appears to show that the Arroyo government cannot just ignore the calls for the resumption of the peace talks with the MILF. The calls also indicate that the Mindanao peace groups and Moro communities prefer that the government resume the talks with the MILF to having dialogue with them.
But the conditions for the resumption according to the new policy are not encouraging. They are bound to be rejected by the MILF. First, the MOA-AD will only be one of the references. Second, the surrender of the three commanders as a must-condition for the resumption has already been rejected by the MILF.
How will the MOA-AD fare as a reference? The GRP panel will include representatives from sectors hostile to the MOA-AD. This will ensure the exclusion of the vision of the ancestral domain and the root of the Moro problem from the negotiation. How can the peace talks under these circumstances address the root of the Moro or Mindanao problem?
Will there be a new talking framework centered on DDR? It’s unthinkable that the MILF agree to waste the 11-year negotiation and the incremental agreements leading to the MOA-AD that, together with its mode of implementation, will be embodied in the comprehensive compact. The MILF has served notice that the talks, if resumed, willstart from the MOA-AD and on to the CC.
How can the talks resume under contradictory conditions?
Back to the question: “Will the new policy address effectively the Mindanao problem deeply rooted in the Moro demand for their ancestral domain?” The answer is obvious.
Despite the intimidating odds, the MOA-AD is the only option left. (To be continued)

(”Comment” is Mr. Patricio P. Diaz’ column for MindaViews, the opinion section of MindaNews. The Titus Brandsma Media Awards recently honored Mr. Diaz with a “Lifetime Achievement Award” for his “commitment to education and public information to Mindanawons as Journalist, Educator and Peace Advocate.” You can reach him at patpdiazgsc@yahoo.comThis e-mail address is being protected from spam bots, you need JavaScript enabled to view it .)